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Abstract 
In this study, I use panel data from municipal Japanese National Health Insurance (JNHI) insurers to 
estimate their financial efficiency scores using nonparametric methods and to estimate the causal 
effects of structural and regional characteristics on the efficiency scores consistently using econometric 
methods. The major findings of this study are as follows. First, the estimated efficiency scores imply 
that many JNHI insurers have serious financial inefficiencies, and that total cost efficiency (economic 
efficiency) is strongly and positively correlated with allocative efficiency. Second, the empirical results 
of the effects of various factors on efficiency scores indicate that the two major policy reforms for 
health care systems for the elderly in 2008 contribute strongly to the improvement of JNHI insurers’ 
finances. Third, the subsidy from a prefectural government positively affects efficiencies, but subsidies 
from central and municipal governments have an adverse effect. Fourth, contributions to health care 
systems for the elderly still have an adverse effect on JNHI finances. 
Keywords 
cost efficiencies, Japanese National Health Insurance system, data envelopment analysis, panel data 
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1. Introduction (Note 1) 
The development of health insurance systems has contributed to improvements in health, quality of life, 
and life expectancy worldwide. In Japan, the revision of the National Health Insurance Act in 1958 
created a universal public health insurance system by requiring uninsured individuals to become 
insured through the municipality-based Japanese National Health Insurance (JNHI) system. The 
Japanese universal health insurance system has enabled Japanese citizens to access high-quality health 
care services at affordable prices. As a result, health levels and life expectancy in Japan quickly became 
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the highest in the world (Ikeda et al., 2011; Ikegami et al., 2011). 
Notwithstanding the previous excellent performance of Japan’s universal health insurance system, its 
present finances and future financial sustainability are threatened by demographic and economic factors. 
The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW) (2016) reported that 967 JNHI insurers 
(56.4 percent of the total) experienced budget deficits in 2014. The deficits were chronic for 569 of 
those insurers; in 2014, the total deficit of JNHI insurers was approximately 359 billion yen. The 
tenuousness of the present situation can be traced to a number of factors including the aging population 
of enrolled members, increases in the number of low-income members, an increase in the number of 
small-scale insurers, decreases in premium payment rates, and regional disparities in health care 
expenditures and premiums (Yamada, 1997; Kishida, 2002; Izumida, 2003; National Health Insurance 
Division, Health Insurance Bureau, and the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2006; Yuda, 2010). 
In addition, approximately half the expenses of the JNHI system have been financed by government 
subsidies at central and local levels. These subsidies have contributed to the stability of the insurers’ 
finances, but also provided little incentive to improve their operating Cost Efficiency (CE); this is a soft 
budget problem (Tajika & Yui, 1999; Suzuki, 2001; Yoshida & Kawamura, 2008; Yuda, 2016). 
Moreover, the moral hazard for both patients (e.g., more frequent visits to medical institutions) and care 
providers (e.g., extremely supplier-induced demand) leads to excessive expenditures that may 
exacerbate insurers’ fiscal condition (Zweifel & Manning, 2000; McGuire, 2000; Chandra, Cutler, & 
Song, 2012; Dranove, 2012). With the public finances of JNHI insurers on track toward insolvency, the 
MHLW is currently attempting to design policy reforms to avert more serious systemic problems. 
This study aims to explore how these various structural and regional factors currently experienced by 
the JNHI insurers affect their finances in terms of their CEs. The results of this study have important 
policy implications for future reforms of the JNHI system. As Japan is at the global forefront of 
population aging, the Japanese experience may provide important lessons for other countries with aging 
populations that have introduced universal health insurance systems. However, these Japanese studies 
have two crucial analytical problems, which have resulted in serious misunderstandings. First, the cost 
functions estimated in all of the previous Japanese studies, except for those of Yuda (2010, 2016), do 
not include both the output variables and factor prices. Thus, their equations are not based on economic 
theory and the results are inconsistent because of a serious omitted variables bias problem. Second, 
Yuda (2010, 2016) imposes several restrictions on the background theoretical and empirical models 
because of technical problems. However, these restrictions do not necessarily ensure consistent causal 
effects. To overcome these analytical problems, I employ a more general efficiency approach as with 
Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010). Specifically, I first measure each JNHI insurer’s CE scores 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). I then estimate the causal effects of the various structural and 
regional factors on CEs using the Tobit model. In addition, I use insurer-level panel data to obtain more 
general and consistent estimators than those of Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010) and Yuda (2016), 
as mentioned in Section 2.1. 
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The major findings of this study are as follows. First, estimated efficiency scores imply that many JNHI 
insurers have serious financial inefficiencies, and that total CE (economic efficiency) is strongly and 
positively correlated with Allocative Efficiency (AE). Second, the empirical results of the effects of 
various factors on efficiency scores indicate that the two major policy reforms for the health care 
system for the elderly in 2008 contributed strongly to the improvement of JNHI insurers’ finances. 
Third, the subsidy from a prefectural government positively affects efficiencies, but subsidies from 
central and municipal governments have an adverse effect. Fourth, the contributions to health care 
systems for the elderly still have an adverse effect on JNHI finances, as found by Yuda (2016). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the two earlier studies 
most closely related to this study and present my analytical background. In Section 3, I present details 
of the data. In Section 4, I present empirical results. In Section 5, I conclude. 
 
2. Analytical Frameworks 
2.1 Closely Related Previous Studies and the Empirical Strategy 
In this subsection, I review two closely related previous studies: Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010) 
and Yuda (2016). 
Yuda (2016) employs stochastic frontier models to examine the sources of CEs in the JNHI insurance 
system using municipal insurers’ panel data. Yuda (2016) finds that adverse effects on efficiency are 
mainly associated with the aging of the insured population, soft budget constraints caused by 
government subsidies, and insurer contributions to health care systems for the elderly. However, Yuda 
(2016) imposes several restrictions on the background theoretical and empirical models because of the 
technical problem of nonconvergence of some log-likelihood functions. These restrictions do not 
necessarily ensure consistent causal effects, and in fact, all estimated CEs and AEs, theoretically 
defined as (0,1), greatly exceed one. The first specific restriction is to assume a Cobb-Douglas function, 
which is one of the special forms of a constant elasticity of substitution function. Second, Yuda (2016) 
also assumes that the inefficiency term is distributed as a half-normal distribution. Because the results 
sometimes depend on the assumptions underlying the functional specification of the distribution of the 
inefficiency term, it is unclear whether the results are robust. Third, the empirical models used in Yuda 
(2016) are the pooled and random effects models, despite using insurer-level panel data. The empirical 
results would be biased because the pooled estimation cannot consider time series variations among 
insurers and because the random effects assumption that unobserved individual heterogeneity is not 
correlated with the independent variables is generally too restrictive. 
One of the solutions for the first and second problems is to use the DEA method to estimate efficiency 
scores, as with Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010). DEA involves the use of linear programing 
methods to construct a nonparametric piecewise frontier over the data and calculate efficiencies relative 
to this frontier (Coelli, 1996). Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010) empirically examine the impact of 
health insurance on the Technical Efficiency (TE) of health production by using data across the 
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metropolitan statistics area and find that insurance coverage generates inefficiency, but that the 
efficiency loss appears to be relatively small in the extensive margin. However, they have the same 
problem as Yuda (2016) because their estimates are also obtained using pooled and random effects 
models. That is, the TE scores in Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010) would be biased because they 
did not consider within variations, and this bias would more seriously affect the empirical results in the 
second-stage Tobit analysis. A simple solution to this problem is to employ the Fixed Effects (FE) 
model, which allows unobserved individual heterogeneity to be correlated with the independent 
variables. Unfortunately, although Charnes et al. (1985) propose a panel DEA model, the FE Tobit 
model proposed by Heckman and McCurdy (1980) and Honoré (1992) has poor empirical performance 
because of the computational issue. Instead, I attempt to use First-Differenced (FD) data to remove the 
FE. 
Moreover, I ease the following three analytical restrictions in Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010) 
and Yuda (2016) to obtain more general and consistent estimators. First, I employ a multiple outputs 
and inputs model for measuring efficiency scores. These two studies use a one-output and multi-inputs 
model, but the multiple outputs and inputs model is more appropriate for providing better estimations 
because the health insurance system provides many outcomes, including health promotion, risk 
dispersion, and self-management. Second, I assume Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) in the model when 
estimating the efficiency scores using DEA. Although Bates, Mukherjee and Santerre (2010) use a 
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) model, the CRS assumption is appropriate only when all insurers are 
operating at an optimal scale. However, imperfect competition, government regulations, and constraints 
on finance may cause a firm to operate at a suboptimal scale. Their results assumed the CRS 
specification results in measures of TE confounded by Scale Efficiencies (SEs), but assuming the VRS 
specification permits the calculation of TE devoid of these SE effects. Third, Bates, Mukherjee and 
Santerre (2010) only focus on TE, which reflects the ability of an insurer to obtain maximal output 
from a given set of inputs and Yuda (2016) only estimates the causal effects on CE (Note 2). However, 
CE can be decomposed into TE and AE. A firm’s AE reflects the ability to use its inputs in optimal 
proportions, given their respective prices. In terms of health insurance finance, the TE represents 
factors not attributable to insurers and the AE those attributable to insurers. Because they are different 
characteristics, this decomposition is important for obtaining useful policy implications for future 
policy reforms of the system. 
The remainder of this section presents the specific empirical models used in this study. 
2.2 Estimating Efficiencies by the DEA 
For the case of VRS, cost minimization of the input-oriented DEA model is conducted to first obtain 
TEs (Coelli et al., 2005). 
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where  is a scalar, which represents insurer i’s TE score (Farrell, 1957). The variables q and x are the 
column vector of insurer i’s M outputs and N inputs, respectively. The MI output matrix Q and NI 
input matrix X represent the data for all I insurers. The parameter  is a I1 vector of constants. This 
linear programing problem is solved I times, once for each insurer in the sample. A value of i=TEi is 
obtained for each insurer. The next step requires the solutions of the following cost minimization DEA: 
 
 
 
 
 
where wi is a N1 vector of input prices for the ith insurer and x
*
i is the cost-minimizing vector of input 
quantities for the ith insurer given the input price wi and the output levels qi; and  is the 
convexity constraint. Then, the CE of insurer i is defined as the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost: 
                                   (1) 
The AE is also calculated as 
                                     (2) 
These three measures of TE, AE, and CE can take values ranging from 0 to 1, where a value of 1 
indicates full efficiency. 
2.3 Closely Related Previous Studies and the Empirical Strategy 
To examine the causal effects of the efficiency scores, I first consider the following simple linear 
equations. 
 
 
 
where ln(zit) includes the logarithms of the control variables representing demographic, financial, and 
market conditions of insurer i in year t. Here, e is the individual-insurer effect and u is an error term. 
Parameters in these equations take on negative values when the control variables negatively affect an 
insurer’s finances. 
To eliminate the insurer effect by first-differencing, the models are: 
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where TE, AE, and CE represent efficiency scores obtained from DEA using the FD data, and 
ln(z) represents the first-differenced variables. When a constant term, , is 
added to the equations, it can be interpreted as the annual effect of, e.g., policy reforms during the study 
period. 
 
 
 
Specifically, the equations particularly capture when two major reforms are introduced to the health 
insurance systems for the elderly. The first reform is the introduction of a reinsurance scheme at the 
national level to cover medical expenditures for elderly aged 65 to 74 years. Although the JNHI 
insurers were reimbursed for their medical expenditure before April 2008, the reinsurance scheme now 
provides financial support for JNHI insurers. The second reform was the introduction of the Long-life 
Health Care System (LHCS), a special health insurance system for those aged 75 years and over. 
Because most of those aged 75 years and over had been exempt from paying insurance premiums 
because of their low income, their medical expenditure was reimbursed by the public health insurance 
system including the JNHI under the previous Elderly Health Care System (EHCS) from February 
1983 to March 2007. After April 2008, their premium contribution covered 10 percent of their medical 
expenditure. Since these drastic reforms of the health care systems for the elderly reduce the financial 
burden on the JNHI system, they positively affect the finances of the JNHI (Note 3). 
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data on municipal insurers are taken from the Japanese MHLW’s Annual Report on National Health 
Insurance Activity for 2005 and 2010. These statistics survey the details of insurer characteristics, 
including enrollee structure, accounting measures and insurance benefits. I merge these details with 
several variables at the municipality level taken from other sources of public statistics to produce 
two-year insurers’ panel data, which is the same sample as that of Yuda (2016). Table 1 reports the 
summary statistics of the variables and their sources. 
During the estimation process, Cummins and Weiss (2011) note that careful definition of outputs and 
inputs and their corresponding factor prices is key to reliable efficiency estimation and is consistent 
with economic insurance theory. I modify their approach because the JNHI system is a public health 
insurance system in which the insurers are municipalities operating in a quasi-market (Le Grand, 2007). 
The two output variables q include the net revenue of the JNHI special account maintained by the 
municipal government and life expectancy in the insuring municipality. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables (1) Mean SD Min Max Source(4) 
Endogenous variables      
Net revenue (million yen) 8.071  139.686  -6746.042  1143.406  [1] 
Life expectancy(2) (years)  82.530  0.820  79.400  85.050  [2] 
Input variables      
Number of administrative staff 10.146  22.129  0.000  573.500  [1] 
Number of medical institutions 102.393  294.446  0.000  5769.000  [1], [3] 
Number of physicians 215.988  663.685  1.000  11349.00
0  
[1], [4] 
Equity capital (100 million yen) -0.002  0.076  -3.960  0.000  [1] 
Corresponding factor prices (million yen)      
Administrative cost per staff  0.851  0.624  0.000  15.367  [1] 
Health insurance reimbursement per medical institution  6.038  2.225  0.245  36.769  [1], [3] 
Health insurance reimbursement per physician 4.646  3.146  0.078  49.122  [1], [4] 
Debt expenditure  3226.783  102.943  1.000  3915.659  [1] 
Control variables      
Number of insured (thousand people) 21.197  50.332  0.097  941.021  [1] 
Ratio of fiscal adjustment subsidy to revenue (%) 0.773  0.952  0.000  10.057  [1] 
Ratio of prefectural government subsidy to revenue (%) 0.442  0.504  0.007  3.434  [1] 
Ratio of transfers from municipality to revenue (%) 1.064  1.568  0.007  15.585  [1] 
Ratio of nonstatutory transfer to municipality transfer (%) 17.367  21.973  0.000  88.555  [1] 
Ratio of joint insurance grant to revenue (%) 0.939  1.375  0.003  11.681  [1] 
Premium payment rate (%) 91.772  4.049  71.944  100.000  [1] 
Contribution to the health care systems for the elderly (million yen) 113.192  292.117  0.419  6710.767  [1] 
Physician density (per 1,000 residents) (3) 1.544  1.602  0.104  30.028  [4], [5] 
Dentist density (per 1,000 residents) (3) 0.658  0.831  0.043  33.068  [4], [5] 
Hospital bed density (per 1,000 residents) (3) 10.489  8.415  0.022  106.025  [4], [5] 
Number of observations   3410    
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Note. (1) All yen are adjusted to 2010 prices using the consumer price index. Variables with minimum 
values less than zero are adjusted to allow for log transformation. 
(2) Average life expectancy between females and males. 
(3) Numerical values except for the survey year are calculated by linear interpolation. 
(4) Sources are as follows: [1] Annual Report on the National Health Insurance Activity (2005, 2010), 
the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, [2] Municipal Life Tables (2005, 2010), the Ministry of 
Health, Labour, and Welfare, [3] Survey of Medical Institutions (2005, 2010), the Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare, [4] Survey of Physicians, Dentists and Pharmacists (2004, 2006, 2010), the 
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, and [5] Population Census (2005, 2010), Statistical Bureau, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
 
Net revenue is the foremost indicator of JNHI’s finances and its selection is supported by the economic 
theory of insurance (Cummins & Weiss, 2011). Life expectancy is commonly used as a measure of 
health outcomes at the country or regional level (Note 4). The mean of the net revenue of JNHI special 
accounts is approximately 8.1 million yen, with negative values exhibited for about 30 percent of the 
observations, and the mean life expectancy is 82.5 years. 
Input variables x are typically classified into three principal groups: labor, capital, and business services 
and materials (Cummins & Weiss, 2011). Following Yuda (2016), I focus on labor and capital as input 
variables because the business services and materials provided by public health insurance providers are 
difficult to define and quantify. As labor inputs, I use the size of the administrative staff of municipal 
insurers and the number of medical institutions, as well as the number of physicians. In Japan, 
physicians serving in medical institutions are not independent economic agents but rather function as 
production inputs of the institutions. Insurers reimburse medical institutions for the cost of physician 
services instead of issuing payments directly to individual physicians (Hashimoto & Izumida, 2016, 
p.13) and medical institutions accounted for approximately 67 percent of the total expenditures of the 
JNHI insurance system in 2014 (MHLW, 2016). To proxy the capital inputs, I follow the common 
practice in efficiency analysis and use an insurer’s equity capital (Cummins & Weiss, 2011). The factor 
price for administrative labor input is the cost per staff member. The factor prices for physicians and 
medical institutions are their respective insurance reimbursement rates.  
For capital, the expected market return on equity capital is the ideal measure of cost (Cummins & 
Weiss, 2011). However, because JNHI insurers do not issue dividend-yielding shares, I use the cost of 
their debt as the proxy. Inputs per insurer are, on average, 10.1 administrative staff, 102.4 medical 
institutions, and 216.0 physicians. Mean annual costs are 0.85 million yen per administrative staff 
member, 6.0 million yen per medical institution and 4.6 million yen per physician. The mean debt 
expenditure is 3.2 billion yen per year. 
Table 1 also includes the control variables z that may affect efficiency in JNHI insurers as proposed by 
the National Health Insurance Division of the Health Insurance Bureau of the MHLW (2006) and 
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previous Japanese studies. They are grouped into three categories pertaining to the demographic 
structure of the insured, financial elements of the JNHI system and conditions in the market for medical 
care. A key demographic measure (Note 5) is the number of insured and its square, which captures a 
scale effect. Larger insured pools contribute to financial stability and are thus expected to have a 
positive effect on efficiency. Key financial elements of the JNHI system include: five types of 
government subsidies, the premium payment rate and the financial contribution to the health care 
systems for the elderly. Approximately half of the expenses of the JNHI system have been financed by 
government subsidies at central and local levels. These subsidies have contributed to stability in the 
insurers’ finances but have also led to soft budget problems (Tajika & Yui, 1999; Suzuki, 2001; Yoshida 
& Kawamura, 2008; Yuda, 2016). The subsidies are designed to achieve differing goals. The fiscal 
adjustment subsidy and the prefectural government subsidy reduce fiscal imbalances among municipal 
insurers. The joint insurance grant is a reinsurance benefit for high health care expenditures. Transfers 
from a municipality’s general account are classified into two types: statutory and nonstatutory. The 
latter transfer is intended to stabilize the finances of the insurers, whereas a nonstatutory transfer is 
mainly aimed at covering deficits. The nonstatutory transfer is especially contrary to the principle of 
insurance because the financial resources for this transfer come from local taxes. In other words, this 
subsidy is an actual income transfer from local taxpayers to people insured by the JNHI. This variable 
is a proxy for the seriousness of the soft budget problem. The premium payment rate measures 
payments collected relative to amounts due. A lower premium payment rate indicates failure in 
collection, which has a negative effect on the insurer’s finances. Another factor that impinges on the 
finances of the JNHI insurers is their contribution to the EHCS or LHCS. The rapid and continued 
aging of Japan’s population has caused medical benefits payable on behalf of the elderly to increase, 
which has worsened insurers’ already poor finances. In fact, this burden has gradually increased in 
recent years and has directly led to serious financial problems for public health insurers (MHLW, 2016). 
Variables reflecting conditions in the market for medical care include the densities of physicians, 
dentists, and hospital beds expressed per 1,000 residents. Although an increase in these densities 
improves an insured person’s access to medical care, payouts of health care benefits may also increase 
because of the incentive to both demand and supply unnecessary treatments created by the insurance 
system, which is a moral hazard affecting both patients and providers. 
 
4. Empirical Results (Note 6) 
4.1 Estimation Results of Efficiency Scores 
Table 2 and Figure 1 summarize the efficiency scores obtained by DEA (Note 7). The mean and 
standard deviation of CE are 0.158 and 0.168, respectively, which indicates that there are many 
financially inefficient insurers. The mean and standard deviation of TE are 0.862 and 0.050, 
respectively. In contrast, the mean of AE is 0.178, which is one-fifth of that of TE, and the standard 
deviation is 0.182, which is bigger than that of TE. The correlation coefficient between CE and AE is 
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positive and strong (0.998) which is larger than that between CE and TE (0.524) (Note 8). This 
tendency is consistent with Yuda (2016) and implies that the key to improving the finances of the JNHI 
insurers is to introduce an effective measure to improve AE. 
 
Table 2. Distributions of Efficiency Scores 
Efficiency TE AE CE 
Mean 0.572  0.011  0.006  
Std. dvi 0.109  0.024  0.024  
Min 0.196  0.000  0.000  
Max 1.000  1.000  1.000  
Number of observations  1705  
 
 
Figure 1. Distributions of Efficiency Scores 
 
Table 3. Empirical Results of the Effects on Cost Efficiency 
Method Tobit OLS Tobit OLS 
Number of insured -0.537***  -0.537***  -0.424***  -0.424***  
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.103) (0.102) 
Squared number of the insured -0.022  -0.022  0.016  0.016  
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) 
Fiscal adjustment subsidy -0.046***  -0.046***  -0.021**  -0.021**  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Prefectural government subsidy 0.132***  0.133***  0.005  0.005  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
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Transfers from municipality -0.037**  -0.037**  -0.012  -0.012  
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Nonstatutory transfer 0.010***  0.010***  -0.002  -0.002  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Joint insurance grant 0.036***  0.036***  0.000  0.000  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Premium payment rate -0.007  -0.007  0.007  0.007  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Contribution to the health care systems for the elderly -0.055***  -0.055***  0.001  0.001  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Physician density 0.021  0.021  -0.029*  -0.029*  
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Dentist density -0.044***  -0.044***  -0.012*  -0.012*  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Hospital beds density -0.006  -0.006  0.003  0.003  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant   0.138***  0.138***  
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Standard error of the regression 0.174***   0.165***   
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Number of observations 1705 1705 1705 1705 
Log likelihood 559.483  566.119  646.159  653.012  
R-squared N.A. 0.434  -0.045  0.032  
Note. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
4.2 Empirical Results of Causal Effects on Efficiencies 
Tables 3-5 show the estimation results for the Tobit and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models using 
the FD data. First, the results for Tobit models are quite similar to those of OLS. Second, the 
coefficients of a constant term that captures a yearly effect are statistically and significantly positive. In 
particular, the coefficients of that constant term are larger than those of other control variables, and 
those of control variables in the models with a year effect approach zero compared with those without a 
year effect. These results imply that the introduction of the two major health insurance reforms for the 
elderly contributed to improving the efficiency of JNHI finances. 
Table 3 shows the results of the effects on CE. The coefficients of the number of insured, fiscal 
adjustment subsidy and dentist density are significantly negative in the models with and without a year 
effect. These results intuitively contradict the economic insurance theory that an increase of insurer 
scale adversely influences CE. However, as shown in Appendix D, CE scores of city insurers are lower 
than those of rural insurers. Therefore, this result must reflect fundamental structural differences 
reflected in the city scale.  
The significant negative effect of the fiscal adjustment subsidy on CE implies that insurers are 
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oversubsidized for differences in fiscal status, which means that this subsidy creates a soft budget 
problem. The significant negative effect of dentist density would be caused by patients’ overutilization, 
exacerbated by supplier-induced demand caused by the fierce competition in the dental care market in 
Japan. In the models without a year effect, the coefficients of transfers from municipal governments 
and contributions to the health care systems for the elderly are significantly negative. The adverse 
effect of transfers from municipal governments on CE also implies the existence of the soft budget 
problem. The positive effect of contributions to the health care systems for the elderly demonstrates 
that efficiency in the health care systems for the elderly is compromised, which and contributes to the 
deterioration of JNHI finances. In addition, prefectural government subsidies, the nonstationary transfer 
ratio, and the joint insurance grant significantly and positively affect CE. The positive effect of 
prefectural government subsidies reflects the economic efficiency of an appropriate subsidy to insurers. 
The positive effect of the nonstationary ratio may imply that this is a necessary cost of maintaining a 
universal public health insurance system. The positive effect of the joint insurance grant indicates that 
this reinsurance scheme functions successfully as risk diversion to cover patients’ expenditure 
following catastrophic medical events. 
 
Table 4. Empirical Results of the Effects on Technical Efficiency 
Method Tobit OLS Tobit OLS 
Number of insured -0.845***  -0.845***  -0.152***  -0.153***  
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.022) (0.022) 
Squared number of the insured -0.248***  -0.248***  -0.017**  -0.017**  
 (0.074) (0.073) (0.007) (0.007) 
Fiscal adjustment subsidy -0.174***  -0.174***  -0.017***  -0.017***  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prefectural government subsidy 0.784***  0.785***  0.002  0.002  
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.005) (0.005) 
Transfers from municipality -0.162***  -0.158***  -0.007**  -0.007*  
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.004) (0.004) 
Nonstatutory transfer 0.073***  0.073***  0.001  0.001  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
Joint insurance grant 0.215***  0.215***  -0.004***  -0.004***  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Premium payment rate -0.088***  -0.089***  -0.006***  -0.006***  
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.002) (0.002) 
Contribution to the health care systems for the elderly -0.353***  -0.353***  -0.008***  -0.008***  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) 
Physician density 0.284***  0.286***  -0.021***  -0.021***  
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dentist density -0.208***  -0.206***  -0.007***  -0.007***  
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hospital beds density -0.057***  -0.058***  -0.002  -0.002  
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 (0.022) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant   0.847***  0.847***  
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Standard error of the regression 0.336***   0.046***   
 (0.008)  (0.003)  
Number of observations 1705 1705 1705 1705 
Log likelihood -565.056  -552.180  2787.570  2825.921  
R-squared N.A. 0.850  -0.052  0.151  
Note. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the effects on TE. As with Table 3, the coefficients of the number of the 
insured, the fiscal adjustment subsidy, and the dentist density are significantly negative in all models, 
with and without a year effect. Moreover, the number insured squared, the transfer from municipal 
government, the premium rate and the contribution to the health care systems for the elderly also 
significantly and positively affect TE in both models. Although the effect of premium payment rate is 
contrary to expectation, its marginal effect is small. In the models without a year effect, the prefectural 
government subsidy and nonstationary transfer ratio also have significantly positive effects on TE as 
shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 5. Empirical Results of the Effects on Allocative Efficiency 
Method Tobit OLS Tobit OLS 
Number of insured -0.569***  -0.568***  -0.439***  -0.438***  
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.109) (0.109) 
Squared number of the insured -0.026  -0.026  0.018  0.018  
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.026) (0.026) 
Fiscal adjustment subsidy -0.050***  -0.050***  -0.021**  -0.021**  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Prefectural government subsidy 0.153***  0.154***  0.007  0.007  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Transfers from municipality -0.039**  -0.039**  -0.011  -0.011  
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Nonstatutory transfer 0.011***  0.011***  -0.002  -0.002  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Joint insurance grant 0.042***  0.041***  0.001  0.001  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Premium payment rate -0.007  -0.008  0.008  0.008  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Contribution to the health care systems for the elderly -0.062***  -0.062***  0.003  0.003  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Physician density 0.029*  0.029*  -0.028*  -0.029*  
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
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Dentist density -0.049***  -0.049***  -0.012  -0.011  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Hospital beds density -0.007  -0.007  0.004  0.004  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant   0.158***  0.158***  
   (0.011) (0.011) 
Standard error of the regression 0.190***   0.179***   
 (0.004)  (0.004)  
Number of observations 1705 1705 1705 1705 
Log likelihood 409.755  416.004  505.808  512.297  
R-squared N.A. 0.446  -0.050  0.028  
Note. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the effects on AE. As with Tables 3 and 4, the coefficients of the number of 
the insured and the fiscal adjustment subsidy are significantly negative in the models both with and 
without a year effect. In addition, in the model without a year effect, transfer from municipal 
government, contributions to the health care systems for the elderly and dentist density significantly 
and negatively affect AE. In addition, the prefectural government subsidy, the nonstationary transfer 
ratio and the joint insurance grant significantly and positively affect TE in the model without a year 
effect. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, I use the JNHI municipal insurers’ panel data to estimate their financial efficiency scores 
using nonparametric methods, and estimate the causal effects of structural and regional characteristics 
on the efficiency scores by econometric methods. I am attempting to obtain more robust and consistent 
results than those of previous studies. The estimated efficiency scores reveal that there are many 
insurers with serious financial inefficiencies and that CE is strongly and positively correlated with AE. 
The main empirical results of estimating the causal effects of various factors on the efficiency scores 
are as follows. First, the two major policy reforms to the elderly health care systems contribute greatly 
to improvement of the JNHI insurers’ finances. Second, subsidies from prefectural governments 
positively affect efficiencies, but subsidies from central and municipal governments adversely affect 
them. Third, contributions to the health care systems for the elderly negatively affect JNHI finances, as 
Yuda (2016) has found. 
The second finding indicates that some subsidies are not appropriate and have not fulfilled their 
original purposes. Specifically, the subsidy from prefectural governments improves insurers’ financial 
efficiency, but those from municipal governments, and the uniform subsidy from the central 
government cause a soft budget problem. Because the size of the budget has been stable, it is necessary 
to reconsider allocation and structure to operate the public local health insurance system efficiently. 
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This reallocation would improve the efficiency of the JNHI system and social welfare. This result also 
implies that it is important that the prefectural governments that have supervisory responsibilities over 
their municipal insurers should more comprehensively manage them. This result bodes well for the 
reorganization of the JNHI system at the prefectural level, which is slated to occur in 2018. Moreover, I 
find that the contribution to the health care systems for the elderly negatively affects JNHI finances as 
suggested by the MHLW report (2016) and Yuda (2016). It is necessary to implement policy reforms to 
the elderly health care systems for the future maintenance of the universal public health insurance 
scheme and the JNHI system. According to recent Japanese studies, the price elasticity of the medical 
care of elderly patients is low (Shigeoka, 2014; Fukushima et al., 2016) and nonmonetary factors 
strongly affect their demand for outpatient health care (Yuda, 2007). These results would support an 
increase in the copayment rate and an actual restriction on the free-access system to control health care 
expenditure by the elderly appropriately. 
Finally, if the government implements policy reforms to improve the finances of JNHI insurers, these 
will not necessarily improve the utility of representative individual enrollees or social welfare. A 
simulation analysis involving welfare economics is required to evaluate the effects on welfare of these 
policy reforms. 
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Notes 
Note 1. The appendices to this paper are available at the author’s website: 
https://sites.google.com/site/yudamichi/home/research 
Note 2. CE is defined as the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost. See Equation 1. 
Note 3. However, each effect cannot be estimated because they were introduced simultaneously on 
April 1, 2008. 
Note 4. It should be noted that the life expectancy of the insured population might differ from that of 
the municipality as a whole because not all inhabitants of a municipality are insured through JNHI. 
Note 5. Yuda (2016) additionally uses the proportion of retirees in the insurance pool as a proxy for 
aging, but it should be noted that the definition of this ratio differs between 2005 and 2010. The 
numerator in 2005 is the number of insured aged 65 years and over, but that of 2010 is the number of 
people aged 65 to 74 years, because of the introduction of the LHCS. Because this drastic change in the 
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definition would affect the empirical results and make their interpretation more difficult, I do not use 
this variable in the regression. Appendix A presents the estimation results that include the retired 
enrollee ratio, and the results are fortunately similar to those in Tables 3-5. 
Note 6. Appendix B presents the empirical results assuming CRS. 
Note 7. Appendix C presents each insurer’s estimated efficiency scores. 
Note 8. The correlation coefficient between TE and AE is 0.015. 
 
 
